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PRESERVING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: 
ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK 
Martha McCarthy* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Candor compels the acknowledgment that we can only dimly 
perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in 
this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.1 
This statement regarding Establishment Clause doctrine 
rings as true today as it did when made by Chief Justice Bur-
ger three decades ago. The Supreme Court rendered two sig-
nificant church/state decisions pertaining to schools in June 
2000,2 and although handed down only nine days apart, the 
Court's rationales in these cases are somewhat difficult to rec-
oncile. In fact, it appears that the Court is heading down two 
divergent paths in interpreting Establishment Clause restric-
tions on government action, depending on whether the con-
tested practices involve devotionals in public schools or gov-
ernment assistance to sectarian schools. This article reviews 
these two recent decisions and their implications for Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine and for school policies and practices. 
* Martha McCarthy, Chancellor's Professor, Indiana University; Former Chair, 
Educational Leadership Program; Director, Indiana Education Policy Center; Associate 
Dean of the Faculties, Indiana University; President, Education Law Association; 
President, University Council for Educational Administration, and Vice-President, Di-
vision A of the American Educational Research Association. Publications: Coauthor, 
PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS (Allyn and Bacon, 1''- 4'" 
eds., 1998) and author or coauthor of several other books and more than 150 articles on 
various aspects of students' and teachers' rights, church-state relations, curriculum 
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ligion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause? (IND. L.J., 2000) and Stu-
dents as Targets and Perpetrators of Sexual Harassment: Title IX and Beyond 
(HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J., in press). 
1. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971). 
2. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 793 (2000); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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II. THE SANTA FE CASE 
In Santa Fe Independent School District u. Doe, the Su-
preme Court, in a six-to-three ruling, struck down a Texas 
school district's policy authorizing student-led devotionals be-
fore public school football games as violating the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.3 Parents initially filed suit in 
1995, complaining of numerous proselytizing activities (e.g., 
teachers promoting Christian revival meetings and chastising 
children of minority faiths) in addition to the school district's 
practice of allowing student council officers to read overtly 
Christian prayers at graduation ceremonies and home football 
games. The school district altered its policy pertaining to 
graduation devotionals several times prior to and during the 
litigation in an effort to ensure compliance with Fifth Circuit 
precedent upholding student elections to authorize nonprosely-
tizing, nonsectarian, student-led graduation invocations and 
benedictions. 4 The district finally formalized its football game 
invocations in a policy essentially identical to the graduation 
prayer policy, in that both authorized two elections; one to de-
termine whether to have invocations, and the second to select 
the student to deliver them. Subsequently, the district removed 
the "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing" restriction on the prayers 
in both policies, but included the notation that if judicially en-
joined, the prior policies with this restriction would automati-
cally be in effect.5 The trial court ultimately found that the 
challenged proselytizing incidents had been curbed and were 
not attributable to school district policies or customs, and 
moreover that the plaintiffs did not prove compensable harm. 
But the court ordered the school district to reinstate the "non-
proselytizing, nonsectarian" restriction in its policies pertain-
ing to student-led devotionals at graduations and football 
games. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated its 
position that student-initiated graduation prayers can satisfy 
3. 530 U.S. 290 (2000),120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000). 
4. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert 
denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993). For a discussion of the somewhat complicated develop-
ments during the early stages of the Santa Fe litigation, see Doe v. Santa Fe Indcp. 
Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 809-814 (5'" Cir. 1999). 
5. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812-13. The policy was again modified to eliminate 
"prayer" from its title and to add references to student-led "messages" and "statements" 
in addition to "invocations." 
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the Establishment Clause, but disagreed with the district 
Court's conclusion that prayers referring to specific deities are 
nonsectarian. Focusing on the football game devotionals, the 
appeals court held that this policy abridged the Establishment 
Clause, even if the restriction on the type of prayers was rein-
stated. 6 The appeals court distinguished student-led prayers in 
graduation ceremonies from such devotionals at athletic events 
that occur more frequently, involve a more diverse age span of 
students, and can hardly be justified to make sporting events 
more solemn. 
The Supreme Court agreed to review this decision, limiting 
its ruling to the policy pertaining to student-led prayers before 
football games. Plaintiffs argued that having students decide to 
include invocations at the athletic events and to identify a 
classmate to lead the devotionals removed public school spon-
sorship because the devotionals were initiated by private ac-
tors. Accordingly, they asserted that such private student ex-
pression should be treated like other private speech in that it 
does not implicate Establishment Clause restrictions on gov-
ernment action. 
The Supreme Court majority disagreed with these asser-
tions and went beyond simply affirming the reasoning of the 
appellate court. The majority addressed the broader issue of 
the legal status of student-led devotionals in public education, 
making some important statements regarding what constitutes 
religious expression that is sponsored by the public school or at 
least perceived to be. The Santa Fe majority declared that stu-
dent-led expression at a school event held on school property 
under the supervision of school personnel and representing the 
student body could not be considered private speech. 7 Even 
6. Id. at 816-18. The appellate court emphasized that the "nonsectarian, non-
proselytizing" limitation had been important when it upheld student-initiated gradua-
tion prayers, but concluded that this restriction could not save the student-led prayers 
before football games from being invalidated under the Establishment Clause. In Clear 
Creek 977 F.2d 963, supra note 4, the court further noted that, "a policy is not insulated 
from constitutional scrutiny under the Establishment Clause merely because it permits 
rather than requires religious speech when selected and given by students." I d. at 815-
16. Earlier, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had described a high school graduation 
as a "once-in-a-lifetime event" contrasted with athletic events that are held in settings 
far less solemn and extraordinary. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 
402, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding an Establishment Clause violation in a school dis-
trict allowing employees to lead or encourage prayers in curricular or extracurricular 
public school activities). 
7. 530 U.S. at 309-10. 
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though students made the ultimate choice of speakers and con-
tent, the school authorized the student election in the first 
place. The degree of school involvement gave the impression 
that the devotionals at issue represented the school, leading 
the Court majority to conclude that the practice entailed both 
perceived and actual endorsement of religion. 8 The majority 
reasoned that the policy had a sham secular purpose and, like 
the district's previous initiatives, was intended to promote 
Christian religious observances in school-related events. 9 While 
rejecting the argument that Establishment Clause concerns 
can be eliminated by delegating decisions to students, the ma-
jority emphasized that nothing in the Constitution prohibits 
public school students from voluntarily praying at school; only 
state sponsorshi~ of such devotionals runs afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause. 0 
The Court in Santa Fe reiterated a commitment to the pur-
pose of the Bill of Rights, which is to shield certain subjects 
from the political process, and noted that the Establishment 
Clause is intended "to remove debate over this kind of issue 
from governmental supervision or control."11 From its recent 
decision in Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System 
v. Southworth, the Court emphasized that a student referen-
dum substituting "majority determinations for viewpoint neu-
trality" would undermine the constitutional principle that "mi-
nority views are treated with the same respect as are majority 
views."12 Indeed, the Court reasoned that the use of student 
elections simply intensifies the lack of representation of minor-
ity views, ensuring that they will never be heard. 
The Santa Fe majority relied heavily on Lee v. Weisman in 
8. !d. at 305. Chief Justice Rehnquist severely chastised the majority for strik-
ing down the revised policy before it had even been implemented. See id. at 318 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); infra text accompanying note 21. 
9. !d. at 308-09. The Court noted that the school did not hold a new election pur-
suant to the revised policy but used the results of the election held under the previous 
policy, indicating a continuation of practices to infuse devotionals in public school ac-
tivities. !d. at 309. The Court emphasized that it is necessary to carefully review the 
history and context of the challenged action in determining its facial validity. !d. at 
303. See also infra note 84. 
10. !d. at 313. 
11. !d. at 310. 
12. !d. at 304, quoting Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 
529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (upholding a university's mandatory student activity fees, but 
ruling that student elections to determine what speech is subsidized by the university 
run afoul of the Free Speech Clause by disenfranchising minority viewpoints). 
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which the Supreme Court struck down clergy-led devotionals in 
public school graduations in 1992. 13 In Weisman, the Court 
held that at a minimum, students cannot be coerced to support 
or participate in religious exercises or to make a choice between 
a meaningful school event and being subjected to devotionals 
that offend their religious beliefs. 14 However, the Court in 1992 
did not address the constitutionality of student-initiated devo-
tionals, which became a very volatile issue in the wake of 
Weisman as religious groups and public school districts sought 
creative ways to comply with the letter (if not the intent) of the 
Supreme Court's decision. Challenges to such student-led reli-
gious activities generated conflicting appellate court rulings, 15 
but in the most recent opinions, momentum seemed to be build-
ing to protect student-initiated devotionals as private expres-
sion under the Free Speech Clause. To illustrate, the Santa Fe 
decision was rendered on the heels of two rulings in which the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld student-initiated sec-
tarian graduation messages and other private religious expres-
sion in public schools. Hi 
A number of school districts welcomed a broad interpreta-
tion of Free Speech Clause protection of student religious ex-
pression and accordingly allowed students to orchestrate 
graduation prayers, and in some instances, allowed student-
initiated religious expression in other school activities. 17 But 
13. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
14. !d. But only Justice Kennedy in the Weisman majority asserted that such co-
ercion was required to abridge the Establishment Clause. See infra text accompanying 
note 106. 
15. For example, compare Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993) (upholding student elections to decide 
whether to have student-led graduation devotionals) with ACLU of NJ v. Blackhorse 
Pike RPgional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (striking down such student 
elections among seniors to determine whether prayers will be included in the gradua-
tion cer~mony). 
16. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and re-
manded, 120 S. Ct. 2714 (2000), on remand sub nom., Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 
1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (lifting injunction on private religious speech and affording Free 
Speech Clause protection to student-initiated religious expression in school-related ac-
tivities); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding 
school policy allowing students to select their graduation messages), vacated and re-
manded, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000). See infra text accompanying notes 76-80. 
17. There has been some controversy regarding efforts to designate students' 
graduation speeches as a forum for student expression that will not be subject to prior 
review by school authorities. The Supreme Court has not clarified whether school au-
thorities can relinquish control over students' graduation speeches, although generally 
assumed they can. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), 
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the legitimacy of such practices may be short lived as the Su-
preme Court in Santa Fe appears to have dealt a severe blow to 
this trend of expanding what is considered private religious ex-
pression that is entitled to Free Speech Clause protection. JH 
The Court's conclusion that school districts abridge the Estab-
lishment Clause by allowing students to decide to have stu-
dent-led devotionals at school-sponsored athletic events will 
likely be used by those contesting graduation invocations and 
other types of student-orchestrated religious expression in pub-
lic schools. 
In his biting dissent in Santa Fe, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
not only faulted the majority for its holding but also for its 
tone, which he claimed "bristles with hostility to all things reli-
gious in public life."19 Asserting plausible secular purposes for 
the policy (e.g., to promote good sportsmanship and student 
safety and to establish the appropriate environment for the 
event), the Chief Justice argued that courts should defer to a 
school district's articulated intent for the practices. He further 
contended that the speech at issue under the contested policy 
should be considered private expression. Declaring that gov-
ernment policies are not required to be completely neutral as to 
religious content,20 he faulted the majority for distorting exist-
vacated and remanded en bane, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding Idaho school 
district's policy that barred school authorities from censoring students' graduation 
speeches and granted student speakers, selected by academic standing, discretion to 
select their messages). Although the full Ninth Circuit vacated the ruling because the 
plaintiffs had graduated, the controversial policy remained in force. Yet, courts gener-
ally have ruled that schools are not required to consider the graduation ceremony as a 
forum for student expression and can exert control over students' speeches. If they do 
exercise such administrative approval, they may be obligated to censor speeches that 
promote religious tenets. See Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (relying on Weisman and Santa Fe in upholding a school district's rejection 
of a student's sectarian graduation speech, as the speech would bear the imprint of the 
school district and constitute government endorsement of religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause). 
18. 530 U.S. 290, 309-15 (2000). 
19. !d. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
20. !d. at 325. He accused the majority of applying "the most rigid version of the 
oft-criticized" tripartite Lemon test (requiring government action to have a secular 
purpose, to have a primary effect that neither advances nor impedes religion, and to 
avoid excessive government entanglement with religion). Id. at 319. See infra note 60. 
However, the majority only briefly referred to Lemon, Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314. The 
majority focused on the contested policy's sham secular purpose more than on the other 
elements of the tripartite test, causing Zirkel to characterize the majority opinion as 
"lightly evoking nuances" of the Lemon test. See Perry Zirkel, The Games, They Are A-
Changin', 82 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 175 (2000). 
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ing precedent and invalidating the school district's new policy 
before it had even been put into place. 21 He considered there-
vised policy a good-faith effort to comply with the district 
Court's order. 
Advocates of church/state separation were relieved that the 
Court in Santa Fe concluded that the student-led devotionals 
at issue represented the school because a contrary conclusion 
would have given a green light to all types of student-organized 
religious activities in public education. But the ruling gener-
ated volatile reactions from conservative citizen groups and 
from some school districts that wanted to retain such practices. 
Jan LaRue of the conservative Family Research Council as-
serted that, "the government's 'benign neutrality' toward reli5-
ion in this country is nothing short of malevolent hostility." 2 
Illustrative of protests against the ruling, in the fall 2000, fans 
at football games in a number of school districts throughout the 
south, including the Santa Fe district, stood and "spontane-
ously" recited the Lord's prayer. 23 Rob Boston for Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State indicated that his 
organization had received numerous reports of informal pro-
tests at school events as a result of the Santa Fe ruling. 24 Julie 
Underwood, General Counsel for the National School Boards 
Association, said that school prayer advocates are using other 
creative strategies to bring religion into schools, such as giving 
students book covers with religious messages on them. 25 
III. THE HELMS CASE 
In the second ruling rendered nine days after Santa Fe, the 
Supreme Court in Mitchell u. Helms found no Establishment 
Clause violation in using federal aid to purchase instructional 
materials and equipment for student use in sectarian schools. 26 
21. 5:30 U.S. at 320 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
22. Jan LaRue, Family Research Council, quoted in Supreme Court Says 'No' to 
Student-led Prayers, THE HERALD-TIMES, BLOOMINGTON, IN, June 20, 2000, at Al, 
All. 
23. Movement Hopes to Skirt Supreme Court Ruling, THE HERALD-TIMES, 
BLOOMINCTON, IN, August 24, 2000, at A7. 
24. Group Reports Prayer Protests as School Year Begins, (Sept. 1, 2000) 
<http://www.CNN.com>. 
25. .Julie Underwood, quoted in Courts Will Rule on Important School Issues, 
SCHOOL BOARD NEWS, September 26, 2000, at 6. 
26. 120 S. Cl. 2530 (2000). On remand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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Specifically, the ruling allows public funds for computers, other 
instructional equipment, and library books that are used in re-
ligious schools under the Federal Chapter 2 program of the 
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 (origi-
nally part of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965), which is now Subchapter VI of Chapter 70 of the Im-
proving America's Schools Act of 1994. 27 In the school district 
at issue, abou~ 30% of these funds are allocated for such 
equipment and materials in private - primarily sectarian -
schools. Considerable attention focused on this case because 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had struck down the practice 
under the Establishment Clause, creating a conflict with the 
position taken by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals a few 
years earlier. 28 Compared to the Santa Fe ruling, the Supreme 
Court's action is more difficult to analyze in Helms because it 
has no majority opinion. While six Justices supported the 
Court's holding, only four signed the Helms plurality opinion. 29 
Respondents argued that the aid was divertible for religious 
purposes, was direct and nonincidental, and supplanted rather 
than supplemented private school funds. Justice Thomas, 
speaking for the plurality, found none of these contentions per-
suasive, rejecting a distinction between direct and indirect aid 
that has appeared in prior cases involving challenges to the use 
of government funds in religious schools.30 The plurality rea-
changed its position regarding the federal aid program and its Louisiana counterpart to 
conform with the Supreme Court ruling and reinstated its judgment that the Louisiana 
special education program and transportation program (providing public support for 
children attending parochial schools) were also constitutional. Helms v. Picard, 229 
F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2000). 
27. 20 U.S. C.§§ 7301-7373. Prior to 1994, this provision was codified at 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 2911-2976. 
28. Compare Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998) with Walker v. San 
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no Establishment 
Clause violation in the distribution of Chapter 2 funds to parochial schools). 
29. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy signed Justice 
Thomas' plurality opinion, and Justices O'Connor and Breyer signed a concurring opin-
ion. 
30. 120 S. Ct. at 2544-46. See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373 (1985) (striking down shared-time and community-education programs providing 
classes for nonpublic school students at public expense in rooms leased from the non-
public schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (invalidating direct government 
subsidies to parochial schools in terms of funds for remedial, guidance, and therapeutic 
services provided on parochial school grounds and for instructional materials and 
equipment, standardized tests, and fieldtrip transportion for parochial school stu-
dents); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) 
(invalidating direct public aid to parochial schools for the development and administra-
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soned that religious indoctrination or subsidization cannot be 
attributed to the government when aid, even direct aid, is dis-
tributed based on secular criteria, is available to religious and 
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis, and flows to 
religious schools only because of private choices of parents. 31 
Also rejecting the argument that the aid was unconstitu-
tional because it could be diverted for religious purposes, the 
plurality relied on the neutrality principle in concluding that if 
eligibility for the aid is determined in a manner that satisfies 
the Constitution, subsequent use of the aid for religious pur-
poses is not imputed to the government, "and is thus not of 
constitutional concern."32 Justice Thomas declared for the plu-
rality: "We did not, as respondents do, think that the use of 
governmental aid to further religious indoctrination was syn-
onymous with religious indoctrination by the government or 
that such use of aid created any improper incentives" for par-
ents to send their children to religious schools.a3 Conceding that 
the equipment at issue could be diverted for sectarian uses, the 
plurality asserted that the central issue is not divertibility of 
the aid because government support for secular activities al-
ways frees parochial school resources for religious purposes. 
Instead, the plurality emphasized that the constitutional stan-
dards are whether the aid itself would be appropriate for a pub-
lic school to receive and whether it is distributed in an even-
handed manner - conditions satisfied by the aid at issue in 
Helms. The plurality also dismissed the concern about public 
funds going to "pervasively sectarian" institutions, concluding 
that such an assessment of "degree" discriminates on the basis 
of religion. :14 
Justices O'Connor and Breyer provided the crucial concur-
ring votes to uphold the government aid program in Helms. 35 
They agreed with the four Justices in the plurality that Meek v. 
Pittenger36 and Wolman v. Walter37 were no longer good law in 
tion of state-required and teacher-prepared tests and record-keeping practices). 
31. 120 S. Ct. at 2541. 
32. !d. at 2547. See discussion of the current application of the neutrality princi-
ple, infra text accompanying note 95. 
33. !d. [emphasis added]. 
34. !d. at 2550-51. 
35. !d. at 2556 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
36. 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking down use of public funds for instructional mate-
rials and equipment and provision of auxiliary services in parochial schools). 
37. 433 U.S. 229 (1977), supra note 30. 
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so far as these decisions would prohibit the distribution of aid 
for instructional materials and equipment that might be used 
for some sectarian purposes. Among their holdings, Meek and 
Wolman had barred state aid in the form of providing maps, 
slide projectors, and other materials and equipment to sectar-
ian schools. These six Justices also supported a modification of 
the Lemon test, making it explicit that excessive entanglement 
is simply part of consideration of a policy's effect. 38 The plural-
ity and concurring Justices identified three criteria for assess-
ing a statute's primary effect: whether it results in government 
indoctrination, defines recipients by reference to religion, or 
creates excessive government entanglement with religion.:39 
But Justices O'Connor and Breyer were troubled by parts of 
the sweeping plurality rationale, which they feared would go 
too far in allowing direct aid that advances sectarian objectives 
of religious organizations. They disagreed with the plurality's 
conclusion that any government-aid program would be consti-
tutional solely because the aid is neutrally distributed to reli-
gious and secular entities. They also seemed more interested 
than the plurality in assurances that the aid supplements and 
does not supplant private school funds, and that actual diver-
sion of the aid to religious purposes is de minimis. 40 
Justice Souter, writing a dissenting opinion that was also 
signed by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, found many aspects 
of the plurality opinion problematic. Most importantly, Justice 
Souter asserted that the plurality adopted "a new conception of 
neutrality as a practically sufficient test of constitutionality 
that would, if adopted by the Court, eliminate inquiry into a 
law's effects"41 and negate the constitutional principle that the 
38. This modified Lemon standard is more akin to the Establishment Clause 
standard used prior to 1970. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963) (assessing the purpose and effect of challenged government action in 
striking down daily Bible reading in public schools). Although the Lemon tripartite test 
received its name in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court ac-
tually articulated the three criteria the year before in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 
664 (1970) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to property tax exemptions for 
property used solely for religious worship). See supra note 20 for a description of the 
three-prong test. 
39. The district Court's conclusion that the law has a secular purpose was not 
challenged. Also, the Supreme Court accepted the district Court's conclusion that there 
was no excessive entanglement and thus focused on the first two criteria in determin-
ing that the law's effect was constitutional. See 120 S. Ct., at 2540. 
40. !d. at 2562-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
41. !d. at 2573 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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government cannot aid a school's religious mission. He con-
tended that, "the plurality position breaks fundamentally with 
Establishment Clause principle, and with the methodology 
painstakingly worked out in support of it."42 He noted that over 
time the principle of neutrality had been used in at least three 
ways - to identify the appropriate government posture be-
tween impermissible encouragement or discouragement of re-
ligion, to characterize a government benefit as secular, and 
now to indicate nondiscrimination in conferring benefits on 
secular and religious institutions.43 Justice Souter vigorously 
argued that "evenhandedness neutrality" should not be a 
stand-alone criterion to assess constitutional intent or effect. 44 
He noted that government aid to pervasively sectarian in-
stitutions and to primary and secondary religious schools 
raises particular concerns because younE students are highly 
susceptible to religious indoctrination. While all Justices 
agreed that the government is prohibited from providing aid 
with a clear religious content to public or sectarian schools, the 
three dissenting Justices would have gone further than the plu-
rality in prohibiting aid that can be diverted to religious educa-
tion, particularly direct subsidies to religious schools. Justice 
Souter cited evidence that the aid at issue in Helms already 
had been diverted for sectarian purposes in some of the paro-
chial schools. He also contended that a federal education aid 
program, such as this one that can be used to supplant expen-
ditures for offerings at religious schools, is constitutionally pro-
hibited. 
Those advocating public support for private education were 
encouraged by the Helms ruling, as were proponents of voucher 
programs that allow public funds to flow to parochial schools 
based on parental choices. 46 But critics have voiced great con-
cern that Helms will open the floodgates regarding government 
aid to religious schools. Barry Lynn, Executive Director of 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, has as-
serted that the Helms decision "takes a sled,Behammer" to the 
wall of separation between church and state. 
42. ld. 
43. !d. at 2578. See infra text accompanying note 90. 
44. Id. at 2581. 
45. ld. at 2583. 
46. See infra text accompanying note 98. 
47. Barry Lynn, quoted in Supreme Court Ruling Expands Public Aid to Paro-
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IV. INTERNAL CONSISTENCY IN THESE DIVERGENT PATHS? 
Comparing Helms and Santa Fe, it appears that a block of 
Justices is unwilling to accommodate religious observances in 
public schools, while a different block (with some overlap) is 
willing to accommodate sectarian schools in terms of govern-
ment aid for their students. Thus, the Court appears to be 
heading down somewhat incongruent tracks in these two areas 
of Establishment Clause litigation involving education. The 
"private actor" justification for church/state involvement seems 
persuasive in state-aid cases in that neutrality is assured and 
government involvement reduced if aid goes to religious schools 
because of parents' decisions regarding where their children 
will be educated. However, allowing students to vote to deliver 
religious messages in public schools does not provide a suffi-
cient circuit breaker to make the students private actors, which 
would remove school sponsorship of the student-led religious 
activities. 48 
Only Justice Kennedy endorsed the majority opinion in 
Santa Fe and the plurality opinion in Helms, and Justices 
O'Connor and Breyer joined him in supporting, in part, the dif-
ferent interpretations of Establishment Clause restrictions in 
the two cases. There is some sentiment that the two lines of 
cases are internally congruent in applying the Establishment 
Clause,49 but such consistency is more apparent in recent judi-
cial pronouncements regarding state aid to parochial schools 
than in the judicial posture toward religious influences in pub-
lic education. 
A. The Movement Toward Accommodation in State-Aid Cases 
The Supreme Court's support of religious accommodations 
in terms of allowing government support for rarochial school 
students has been steady at least since 1993,5 with some evi-
chial Schools, Sell. Bo. NEWS, July 11, 2000, at 1, 8. 
48. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. al 2541-42; Santa Fe v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. at 
2277-79. 
49. See Mark Walsh, Church-State Rulings Cut Both Ways, EDUC. WEEK, July 12, 
2000, at 1, 40. 
50. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997) (lifting injunction and rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to the use of 
pubic school personnel to provide remedial services in parochial schools); Rosenberger 
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that the Establish-
ment Clause does not require a public university to deny student activity funds to stu-
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dence of the accommodationist trend much earlier.51 After all, 
government aid to provide transportation and secular text-
books for parochial school students has been upheld since the 
mid-twentieth century,52 and these precedents have not been 
disturbed. Despite Justice Souter's assertion that government 
aid used to supplant private school funds is unconstitutional,53 
for decades the use of public funds to provide textbooks for pa-
rochial school students has allowed the sectarian school's text-
book funds to be redirected for religious purposes. Also, the Su-
preme Court in 1980 found government support for state-
required testing programs in private schools to be constitu-
tional,54 casting doubt on its earlier pronouncements that aid to 
develop and administer state-required as well as teacher-
developed tests abridges the Establishment Clause because 
such tests potentially could be used to advance sectarian pur-
dent groups that will use the funds to distribute sectarian publications); Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (rejecting Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to the use of public funds for sign language interpreters to assist hearing defi-
cient children in parochial schools). But see Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 
(1994); infra note 61. 
51. As Justice Thomas observed in Helms, "the principles of neutrality and pri-
vate choice, and their relationship to each other, were prominent not only in Agostini 
[citation omitted!, but also in Zobrest, Witters, and Mueller." 120 S. Ct. at 2542. See 
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 4 74 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding use of 
federal vocational rehabilitation aid to support ministerial training); Mueller v. Allen, 
463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding state tax benefit for educational expenses available to 
parents of public or private school students). 
52. See Board ofEduc. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1962) (find-
ing no Establishment Clause violation in a state law requiring public school districts to 
loan secular textbooks to all secondary students, including those attending parochial 
schools); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (rejecting an Establishment 
Clause challenge to the use of public funds to provide transportation services for non-
public school students); Cochran v. Louisiana State Ed. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) 
(rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state law requiring books to be fur-
nished free to students attending public or private schools). Everson often is cited as 
the beginning of the separationist period in interpreting the Establishment Clause in 
terms of state aid to parochial schools, because, despite its holding, the Court made a 
strong separationist statement: "Neither a state nor the Federal government can ... 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other .... In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law 
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state,"' 330 U.S. at 15-
16. But the Everson Court also showed some support for the nondiscrimination theory, 
recognizing that the state "cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohamme-
dans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any 
other faith, because of the faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public wel-
fare legislation." !d. at 16. 
53. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 258il-89 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
54. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). 
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Then, in 1993, the Supreme Court found no Establishment 
Clause violation in using public funds for sign language inter-
preters in parochial schools,56 signaling a paradigm shift that 
was solidified in 1997 when the Supreme Court overturned the 
prohibition against allowing public school personnel to provide 
remedial instruction in religious schools. 57 In both of these de-
cisions, the Court rejected the notion that the Establishment 
Clause lays down an "absolute bar to the placing of a public 
employee in a sectarian school."58 And with Helms explicitly 
overturning the holdings of Meek and Wolman regarding the 
use of public funds for instructional equipment and materials 
in sectarian schools, there are very few rulings left that reflect 
the Supreme Court's separationist stance in connection with 
state aid to nonpublic schools. In fact, the Supreme Court 
seems to have dismantled most of the decisions, rendered dur-
ing the heyday of the stringent Lemon test, in which it struck 
down various types ofpublic assistance to private schools.59 
The only separationist decisions of this period that have not 
been eroded at least in part by subsequent Supreme Court 
opinions involved government aid made available solely to pri-
vate schools or their patrons, such as support for nonpublic 
school teachers' salaries in secular subjects, grants to maintain 
private school facilities, and reimbursement to parents for a 
portion of private school tuition. 60 And the only separationist 
55. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 4 72 
(1973), supra note 30; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), supra note 36. 
56. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
57. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), overturning its ruling that barred the 
use of public school personnel to provide Title I remedial services on sectarian school 
premises, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and the portion of its decision that 
invalidated a shared-time program under which public school classes were provided for 
parochial school students on parochial school premises, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), supra note 30. See Ralph Mawdsley, Extending the Limits of 
Permissible Government-Religion Interaction: Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 124 
EDUC. L. REP. 499, 501 (1998). 
58. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993). 
59. This lends some support to Justice Thomas' assertion that Meek and Wolman 
were simply anomalies, 120 S. Ct. at 2540. See supra notes 30 and 36. 
60. See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (striking down reimbursement to 
parents for part of tuition paid to nonpublic schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down direct grants for mainte-
nance and repair of private schools, tuition reimbursements to parents of nonpublic 
school children, and tax benefits restricted to parents of private school students); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down a Rhode Island statute calling 
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decision in this domain in the 1990s was Board of Education v. 
Grumet, in which the Supreme Court struck down a legislative 
attempt to create a separate school district to serve special-
needs Satmar Hasidic children whose strict form of Judaism 
does not allow them to be educated with non-Satmars.61 
B. The Winding Path Involving Student-led Devotionals in 
Public Schools 
The federal judiciary's posture pertaining to devotional ac-
tivities in public schools does not reflect as consistent a trend 
in recent Establishment Clause interpretations. Notwithstand-
ing assertions that public education is the last bastion of 
church/state separation,62 several contrary federal appellate 
decisions have been rendered recently, and some Supreme 
Court action regarding religious influences in public schools is 
difficult to categorize as separationist. Most of these cases have 
involved an expansive view of constitutional protection of pri-
vate religious expression that does not implicate Establishment 
Clause restrictions. 
Starting in the early 1980s the Supreme Court began em-
phasizing the First Amendment principle of equal access for 
and equal treatment of private religious expression. Ira Lupu 
has observed that, "even the standard-bearers of the separa-
tionist tradition have been prepared to cede territory in the 
name of competing rights ... [that] include the rights to be free 
of official discrimination with respect to religious exercise, 
freedom of speech, and freedom of association."6"1 Some com-
for salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in private schools and a Penn-
sylvania statute calling for reimbursement to private schools of the costs of teachers' 
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in secular subjects). See also Levitt v. 
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking down state 
aid earmarked only for private schools in connection with various testing and record-
keeping practices), supra note 30. But the Court subsequently upheld state aid made 
available for state-required testing and recordkeeping practices in both public and pri-
vate schools, Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 
(1980), supra note 54. 
61. 512 U.S. 687 (1994). But see Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 123 F'.3d 1068 
(8th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998) (upholding a school district's decision 
to reopen a one-class school with a modified curriculum in response to a request from 
the Brethren sect); Mawdsley, Extending the Limits of Permissible Government-
Religion Interaction, supra note 57. 
62. See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism 62 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 230, 231-34 (1994). 
63. ld. at 249. 
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mentators have traced the origins of the current version of neu-
trality that prohibits discrimination against religious view-
points to Widmar v. Vincent, in which the Supreme Court held 
in 1981 that state-supported universities could not discrimi-
nate against religious groups in making campus facilities 
available for student organizations to meet. 64 But Douglas Lay-
cock has argued that the roots of the nondiscrimination neu-
trality theory can be traced much further back in First 
Amendment litigation.65 
At the precollegiate level, the Free Speech Clause principle 
was augmented in 1984 by the Equal Access Act (EAA), under 
which federally assisted secondary schools that have estab-
lished a limited forum for student groups to meet during non-
instructional time cannot deny school access to noncurriculum 
student groups based on the religious, philosophical, or politi-
cal content of their meetings.66 In 1990, the Supreme Court in 
Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens 
rejected the contention that the EAA abridges the Establish-
ment Clause because student religious groups are allowed to 
meet, recognizing the law's clear secular purpose of preventin~ 
discrimination against religious and other private expression. 
The Court emphasized that unlike government speech promot-
ing religion that is prohibited by the Establishment Clause, 
private religious expression is protected by the Free Speech 
6R 
and Free Exercise Clauses. In subsequent cases, federal ap-
pellate courts have ruled that the EAA prevails over state con-
stitutional provisions requiring greater separation of church 
69 
and state than demanded by the Establishment Clause, and 
64. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). See Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Govern-
mental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers 46 EMORY L. J. 1, 21 
(1997); Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, supra note 62, at 247. See also 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), where Chief Justic0 
Rehnquist claimed that the Establishment Clause does "not require government neu-
trality between religion and irreligion nor ... prohibit the federal government from 
providing non-discriminatory aid to religion." 
65. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 
EMORY L.J. 43, 62 (1997). 
66. 20 U.S. C. §§ 4071-4074 (2000). 
67. 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990). 
68. !d. at 250. 
69. See Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees of San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 
1535 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on the EAA to allow student religious group to meet dur-
ing lunch period since it was noninstructional time and other student groups were al-
lowed to meet); Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. 
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have allowed student religious groups to require certain offi-
cers to be Christians to safeguard the spiritual content of their 
. 70 
meetmgs. 
During the 1990s, the Supreme Court made some definitive 
pronouncements about the protection of private religious ex-
pression against viewpoint discrimination. In Lamb's Chapel v. 
Center Moriches Union Free School District, the Court held 
that if secular community groups are allowed to use the public 
school after school hours to address particular topics (i.e., fam-
ily life and child rearing), groups that approach these topics 
from religious perspectives cannot be denied public school ac-
cess.71 In essence, school districts cannot enforce policies gov-
erning facility use during nonschool time that entail viewpoint 
discrimination against a religious group's message. Some 
courts have broadly interpreted the Lambs Chapel principle in 
protecting religious viewpoints from differential treatment 
with respect to public school access during nonschool time. 72 
denied, 510 U.S. 819 (1993) (finding that the EAA prevailed over antiestablishment 
provisions in state law; a student religious group could not be barred from the public 
school's limited forum for student meetings). 
70. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 1040 (1996). 
71. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
72. See, e.g., Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. One, 826 F. Supp. 1320 
(D. Wyo. 1993) (ruling that a religious group could rent the high school gymnasium for 
a baccalaureate program because other community groups were allowed to use the 
school gym for various events; finding no school sponsorship even though the school 
band performed and the school's graduation announcements included the baccalaure-
ate program). But courts have ruled that the government can prohibit religious wor-
ship in a limited forum. See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd, 231 F.3d 
937 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding no viewpoint discrimination in school district's policy per-
mitting use of school facilities for recreational and civic activities and excluding politi-
cal meetings, for-profit fund-raising, and religious services); Bronx Household of Faith 
v. Community Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 
1074 (1998) (upholding a school district's prohibition on religious groups using the pub-
lic school on a weekly basis for Sunday worship services, reasoning that the prohibition 
on worship services was viewpoint neutral and appropriate in a limited forum). The 
line may not always be clear, however, between religious worship, which can be barred 
from a limited forum, and the discussion of topics from a religious perspective, which 
must be allowed on any topic that is addressed in the forum from a secular perspective. 
Compare Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 
1994), cert denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995) (holding that since scouts were allowed to meet 
at a public middle school after school hours to discuss character education, it would be 
viewpoint discrimination to bar a parent-led religious youth group access to address 
the same topic) with Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 502 (2d 
Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000) (upholding a school district's denial of 
school access to a religious youth organization under its "community use" policy be-
cause the meetings would entail religious instruction and prayer). Perhaps the Su-
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A 1995 higher education decision, Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of the University of Virginia, can be classified as a 
"state-aid" case, but the Supreme Court also addressed the 
equal treatment of private religious and secular expression. 
Ruling that a public university could not withhold support from 
a student religious group seeking to use student activity funds 
to publish sectarian materials, the Court majority concluded 
that religious material must be treated like other material in 
student-initiated publications. 73 The majority denounced the 
University's attempt to deny support to the religious group as 
discriminating against religious viewpoints of private persons 
whose speech it subsidizes. The Court held that the govern-
ment's equal treatment of religious and secular private expres-
sion is not only permitted by the Establishment Clause, but in 
some circumstances is required by the Free Speech Clause. The 
majority reasoned that since the institution was providing 
"secular printing services on a religion-blind basis," there was 
"no Establishment Clause violation in the University's honor-
ing its duties under the Free Speech Clause."74 
Given the Supreme Court's protection of private religious 
expression against viewpoint discrimination in Lamb's Chapel 
and Rosenberger, it is not surprising that several federal appel-
late courts have relied on these rulin~s in broadly interpreting 
what constitutes such private speech. As noted previously, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals delivered two recent rulings 
that represent an expansive stance regarding the reach of the 
Free Speech Clause in protecting students' private religious 
preme Court will use the latter case to provide some clarification regarding the con-
tentJviewpoint and worship/expression distinctions in facility-use policies. 
73. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
74. I d. at 848. See Arval A. Morris, Separation of Church and State?- Remarks 
on Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 103 EDUC. L. REP. 553-71 (1995). 
75. Even before these decisions, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
practice of allowing students to decide by election whether to have student-led gradua-
tion devotionals. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 
1991), vacated and remanded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), on remand, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993). After two federal appellate courts reached an 
opposite conclusion, the Supreme Court muddied the waters by vacating the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruling, thus reinstating the federal district court's decision that upheld a policy 
allowing students to determine the fate of student-led graduation devotionals. See Har-
ris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 1155 (1996). See 
also ACLU of N.J. v. Blackhorse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 
1996), supra note 15. 
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expression in public schools. 76 In Adler v. Duval County, after a 
lengthy series of court orders, in 2000, the full court reversed 
the appellate panel's decision that had invalidated a contested 
school district policy. 77 The appellate court en bane upheld the 
policy that authorizes public school seniors to select classmates 
to give graduation messages and allows the speakers to choose 
the content, which could be religious. Although the school dis-
trict's memo outlining the policy was entitled "Graduation 
Prayer," the court emphasized that the student election is not 
to identify a classmate to deliver a prayer; the graduation mes-
sage is of unspecified content, which may or may not include a 
prayer. 
In the second Eleventh Circuit ruling, the appeals court in 
Chandler v. James lifted the part of an injunction that had 
prohibited students from publicly expressing religious views in 
most school settings in the Dekalb County, Alabama district. 78 
The court declared that the Establishment Clause does notre-
quire and the Free Speech Clause does not permit suppression 
of student-initiated religious expression in public schools. The 
court emphasized that a school policy tolerating religion "does 
not improperly endorse it."79 However, the Supreme Court va-
cated the appellate decisions in both Chandler and Adler and 
remanded the cases for further consideration in light of Santa 
Fe. 
In October, 2000, the Eleventh Circuit in Chandler rein-
stated its earlier judgment that the injunction could not pro-
hibit genuinely student-initiated religious speech or regulate 
such expression differently from private secular expression.80 
The appeals court reiterated that the district court's injunction 
swept too broadly because it equated all student religious 
speech in a public context at school with expression represent-
ing the public school. Distinguishing the Supreme Court's con-
76. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and re· 
manded, 120 S. Ct. 2714 (2000), on remand sub nom., Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 
1313 (11th Cir. 2000); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000), 
vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000); supra note 16. 
77. 174 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and different results on rehearing en 
bane, 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000). See also Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No 321, 147 
F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded en bane, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999), 
supra note 17. 
78. Chandler, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999). 
79. /d. at 1261. 
80. Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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demnation of school-sponsored student prayer in Santa Fe, the 
appeals court held that Chandler dealt with school censorship 
of students' private religious expression, which is also uncon-
stitutional. If the Supreme Court agrees to review Chandler, 
perhaps it will clarify the circumstances under which religious 
speech in public schools is protected by the Free Speech Clause 
as private expression, and how much control school authorities 
must exert over the activities for the student expression to rep-
resent the school. 
The contention that there is a consistent pattern in cases 
addressing student-led devotionals in public schools or even in 
the Supreme Court's action in this domain is a stretch. The 
tension between separationist doctrine and the equal ac-
cess/treatment concept continues to generate a range of rulings 
regarding religious expression in public schools. 81 Furthermore, 
the legal status of several other issues pertaining to sectarian 
influences in public education remains ambiguous. For exam-
ple, although it appeared settled that public schools would 
abridge the Establishment Clause if they allowed religious 
groups to come into the schools to distribute Bibles and other 
religious materials,R2 some recent decisions do not follow this 
pattern. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a West 
Virginia school district's policy allowing sectarian organiza-
tions along with political groups to distribute materials, such 
as Bibles, in public schools on a designated day because the or-
ganizations were considered private entities that do not repre-
sent the school. 83 Also, despite the Supreme Court's 1980 ruling 
that struck down a state law calling for the posting of the Ten 
81. See Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, supra note 62, at 249. In 
addition to some expansive judicial interpretations of the constitutional protection that 
should be given to private religious expression, see supra note 76, other appellate rul-
ings do not fit a separationist mold. See, e.g., Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112 
F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding a Georgia law that requires a moment for silent 
reflection at the beginning of the day in all public schools); Sherman v. Community 
Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting Establishment Clause 
challenge to an Illinois law requiring the daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance to 
the American flag in public schools, as the phrase "Under God" does not change this 
patriotic observance into a prayer). 
82. See, e.g, Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 508 
u.s. 911 (1993). 
83. Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998). See also 
Bacon v. Bradley-Bourbonnais High Sch. Dist. No. 307, 707 F. Supp. 1005 (C.D. III. 
1989) (upholding distribution of Gideon Bibles on the school-owned sidewalk in front of 
a high school, because it was considered a public forum for use by the general public). 
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Commandments in public schools,84 this topic has recently be-
come controversial again with several state legislatures enact-
ing provisions calling for the Ten Commandments to be dis-
played with other historical documents in public buildings, 
including schools. 85 
Notwithstanding a number of unresolved issues and the ab-
sence of a consistent pattern in public school Establishment 
Clause opinions, the Santa Fe ruling has at least put a damper 
on efforts to extend free speech protection to all devotional ac-
tivities that are led by students in public schools. Thus, for the 
present, it appears that the Establishment Clause may have 
more vitality in public school controversies than in connection 
with government funds flowing to religious schools. 
V. NEW NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE 
•hT z· · r z ~ Heutra ~ty ~s ... a coat o many co ors. 
This observation made by Justice Harlan more than thirty 
years ago understates the difficulties involved in defining the 
governmental neutrality toward religion that the First 
Amendment demands. The search for the appropriate standard 
to govern church/state relations certainly is not a recent di-
lemma. When our Federal Constitution was adopted, this issue 
had "perplexed and plagued the nations of Western Civilization 
for some fourteen centuries."87 By including in the Bill of Rights 
restrictions on federal government activity respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, the United States became unique among 
nations, but delineating the reach of the Establishment Clause 
84. Slone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). The federal judiciary carefully evaluates 
the legislative history of challenged government policies and practices to ascertain if 
they are designed to advance sectarian doctrine. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38, 59-61 (1985) (striking down an Alabama law calling for a daily moment of silence 
for mediation or prayer in public schools as reflecting a legislative intent to have school 
children engage in silent prayer). 
85. See Mark Walsh, Commandments Debate Moues to Statehouse, EDUC. WEEK, 
February 16, 2000, at 18, 21. See also Books v. City of Elkhart, Ind., 235 F.3d 292 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (finding that erection of a monument with the Ten Commandments on the 
municipal building lawn violated the Establishment Clause); See Doe v. Harlan County 
Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (enjoining the posting of the Ten Com-
mandments in Harlan County schools). 
86. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
87. Horace Mann League of the U.S. v. Board of Pub. Works, 220 A.2d 51, 60 (Md. 
1966). 
292 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2001 
has remained elusive. 88 Although "neutrality" often is used to 
characterize the constitutionally required relationship between 
government and religion, there has never been sufficient elabo-
ration as to exactly what the term means or how it can be at-
tained. Stephen Smith has asserted that finding a truly neutral 
theory of religious freedom is impossible in part due to the fact 
that such "theories are always offered from the viewpoint of 
one of the competing positions that generate the need for such 
th ,89 a eory. 
In fact, "neutrality" has been championed both by those as-
serting that government involvement with religion is permissi-
ble and by those claiming that it is strictly prohibited. 90 Often 
cited as the basis for the separationist position is the historic 
Memorial and Remonstrance, adopted in Virginia in 1786, in 
which James Madison argued that the government should have 
no jurisdiction over religion. 91 In 194 7, Justice Rutledge 
equated neutrality with "a complete and permanent separation 
of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by com-
prehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for 
religion,"92 and Justice Clark wrote for the Supreme Court in 
1963 that "wholesome neutrality" withdraws "all legislative 
power respecting religious belief or expression."9a According to 
Justice Souter, the concept of"neutrality" shifted in Lemon and 
its progeny, from "labeling the required position of the govern-
ment to describing a benefit that was nonreligious."!J4 
Currently, however, the term has a much more accommoda-
88. Most Establishment Clause litigation has taken place since the mid-twentieth 
century after the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as incorpo-
rating the religion clauses and making their restrictions, originally directed toward the 
federal government, applicable to state action as well. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303 (1940). The first major Establishment Clause decision was Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (194 7), supra note 52. 
89. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 97 (1995). 
90. See generally, Lisa W. Hanks, Justice Souter: Defining "Substantive Neutral-
ity" in an Age of Religious Politics, 48 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1996); John T. Valauri, The 
Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83 (1986). 
91. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli~:ious Assessments, 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 1786. Justice Rutledge appended to his dissenting opin-
ion in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947) (Rutledge, J. dissenting), the 
entire Remonstrance, id. at 63, and the bill to which it was directed (A Bill Establishing 
a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion), id. at 72. 
92. 330 U.S. at 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
93. Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
94. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 8. Ct. 2530, 2578 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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tionist connotation and seems to be used primarily to depict 
nondiscrimination toward religion, which Laycock refers to as 
"formal neutrality."95 In 1995, Justice Kennedy opined for the 
Supreme Court: "We have held that the guarantee of neutrality 
is respected, not offended, when government, following neutral 
criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients 
whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are 
broad and diverse."96 At least four of the current Supreme 
Court Justices equate "neutrality" with evenhanded treatment 
of religious and secular concerns in terms of government aid,97 
and if the Helms plurality can convince one additional Justice 
to endorse this position, most types of government assistance 
made available to public and religious schools alike would sat-
isfy the Establishment Clause. Legislatures certainly will capi-
talize on the plurality's reasoning in Helms to press the limits 
of religious accommodations allowed under the Establishment 
Clause. 
The plurality's logic will be used to argue not only that gov-
ernment assistance to nonpublic schools should expand, but 
also that the Constitution presents no barrier to proposals to 
fund education by providing parents with vouchers to use at 
the public or private school of their choice. Assuming that the 
aid under a voucher program is distributed in an evenhanded 
manner and goes to parochial schools only because of private 
actions, the criteria articulated by the Helms plurality would 
be satisfied. Despite the mixed scoreboard of lower court rul-
ings involving voucher programs,98 the prospects have become 
95. See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neu-
trality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990). See also Daniel 0. Conkle, The 
Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality 
and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L. J. 1 (2000). 
96. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995). 
97. See the Helms plurality, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000), supra note 29. 
98. Striking down voucher plans on Establishment Clause grounds, see 234 F.3d 
445 (6th Cir. 2000) Stout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, Sim-
mons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999), injunction stayed pending 
appellate reuiew, 120 S. Ct. 443 (1999); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 
(Me. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 364 (1999). Rejecting Establishment Clause chal-
lenges, see Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1 (1999); Jackson v. Benson, 578 
N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 997 (1998). Striking down voucher pro-
grams on state constitutional grounds, see Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont 
Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1066 (1999); Gincomucci 
v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 742 A.2d 1165 (Pa. Commw. 1999). Rejecting a challenge 
to a voucher program under state law, see Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. App. 
2000). See also Kolterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
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considerably brighter for a favorable Supreme Court ruling on 
this topic. If voucher programs do expand and dramatically in-
crease government aid to parochial schools, this could change 
the public/private school ratio in our nation, which would affect 
the electorate's support for public education. Indeed, of the two 
recent Supreme Court decisions, Helms appears to have the 
most substantial implications over the long haul, both in terms 
of education in our nation and Establishment Clause doctrine. 
For a period during the 1990s, it appeared that nondis-
crimination neutrality also was becoming the dominant consid-
eration in assessing the constitutionality of sectarian influ-
ences in public schools if religious expression was involved. As 
discussed, the Supreme Court in Mergens, Lamb's Chapel, and 
Rosenberger made some potent statements regarding the equal 
treatment of sectarian and secular private expression and ex-
panded what would be considered private (in contrast to gov-
ernment-sponsored) expression. 99 Thus, support for equal 
treatment of religious expression seemed to be gaining momen-
tum in Establishment Clause litigation pertaining to religious 
observances and influences in public education. But the Santa 
Fe ruling, although not altering the principle that the Free 
Speech Clause protects private religious expression, has put 
some limits on the types of student expression considered "pri-
vate" and thus beyond the reach of the Establishment Clause. 
Justice O'Connor may be the wild card who could determine 
whether a new accommodationist majority is formed on the 
Court that will adopt the neutrality principle of the Helms plu-
rality at least in state-aid cases. In the past, she has voiced 
support for "private-choice neutrality" in that decisions b~ pri-
vate actors do not implicate the Establishment Clause. 10 She 
reiterated such support for "true private-choice programs" in 
Helms, suggesting that she would view as constitutional gov-
810 (1999) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to state tax credit of up to $500 
for contributions to school tuition organizations to support private school tuition); Mar-
tha McCarthy, School Voucher Plans: Are They Legal? 26 J. EDUC. FIN. 1 (2000). 
99. See supra notes 67, 71, and 73. As discussed, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals already has espoused a broad interpretation of nondiscrimination neutrality in 
finding no Establishment Clause violation in a school district's policy granting religious 
groups access to the public school to distribute Bihles and other sectarian materials on 
the same terms with secular community groups. See Peck v. Upshur County Ed. of 
Educ., 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998), supra text accompanying note 83. 
100. Witters v. Washington Dep't ofServs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,493 (1986) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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ernment aid that flows to private schools because of parents' 
decisions. 101 Thus, Justice O'Connor may join Justices Thomas, 
Scalia, and Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist in upholding 
school voucher plans and possibly other types of government 
aid to religious institutions. Prospects are better for nondis-
crimination neutrality to become the standard in state-aid 
cases than in cases involving student-initiated devotionals in 
public education. Only three of the current members of the Su-
preme Court - Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist - have steadfastly advocated a~plying this standard 
to religious expression in public schools. 1 Justice Kennedy is 
the most promising candidate to join this group since he al-
ready has voiced support for nondiscrimination neutrality in 
state-aid cases. But he has not reflected a consistent pattern in 
church/state rulings involving schools. He is the only current 
Justice who has voted with the majority in all education-
related Establishment Clause cases since he joined the Court, 
whether upholdin~ or invalidating the contested government 
practices at issue, 03 so it is difficult to place Justice Kennedy 
squarely in the separationist or accommodationist camp. He 
101. 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2559-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But she agreed with Jus-
tice Souter that nondiscrimination neutrality as defined by Justice Thomas is not suffi-
cient as the single criterion to justify government aid to religious schools. See id. at 
2557-58. See also supra text accompanying note 44. 
102. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319-324 (2000) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.). See also infra text ac-
companying note 19. 
103. He joined the majority in Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000); Santa Fe 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Board ofEduc. 
v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 
(1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); and Board of Educ. of Westside Commu-
nity Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). In one Establishment Clause case involving 
schools, while supporting the holding of the majority, he wrote a concurring opinion, 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397 (1993) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). In one nonschool Establishment Clause ruling he also con-
curred, Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 587, 624 (1988) (Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concur-
ring) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the facial validity of the Adoles-
cent Family Life Act that provides grants to secular and sectarian organizations for 
research and services pertaining to premarital adolescent sexual activity and specifies 
that counseling services cannot advocate abortions). Also, in another nonschool case, 
Justice Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part, County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring, Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, 
White, & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority in upholding display of a 
menorah with a Christmas tree outside the city-county office building, but disagreeing 
that the display of the creche in county courthouse abridged the Establishment 
Clause). 
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signed the sweeping plurality opinion in Helms but has not al-
ways been aligned with the other three Justices in the plurality 
who have not deviated from an accommodationist stance in Es-
tablishment Clause cases involving public or private school is-
sues. Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Tho-
mas and Scalia dissented in Santa Fe, whereas Justice 
Kennedy sided with the Santa Fe majority and during oral ar-
guments seemed quite concerned about student elections de-
termining whether devotionals would take place. 104 But Justice 
Kennedy also has not usually espoused the reasoning of the 
separationist group. Although he wrote the Court's opinion in 
Lee v. Weisman, he was the only Justice in the five-member 
majority who required evidence of coercion to invalidate the 
clergy-led graduation prayers. 105 The other four Justices signed 
concurring opinions indicating that coercion was sufficient, but 
not required, to abridge the Establishment Clause. 106 Thus, it 
may be possible to convince Justice Kennedy that the bar 
should be raised for the Supreme Court to find public school 
practices in violation of the Establishment Clause since he al-
ready has asserted that at least some form of religious coercion 
would have to be present. 
Still another Justice would be needed to form a solid ac-
commodationist majority favoring nondiscrimination neutrality 
in assessing student-led devotionals in public schools. Of the 
remaining Justices, only Justice O'Connor seems to be a possi-
bility, 107 although it is doubtful that she would transfer her 
support of "private-choice neutrality" to student decisions to 
104. Mark Walsh, Court Hears Arguments in Prayer Case, EDUC. WEEK., April 5, 
2000, at 27. 
105. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594-96 (1992). 
106. The concurring Justices in Weisman asserted that evidence of government 
endorsement of religion suffices to abridge the First Amendment. !d. at 599 (Black-
mun, Stevens, & O'Connor, JJ., concurring); id. at 609 (Souter, Stevens & O'Connor, 
JJ., concurring). 
107. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg are quite unlikely to do so, given that 
their voting records favor separationist doctrine. Although Justice Breyer has a mixed 
voting record in state-aid cases (dissenting in Agostini and Rosenberger, but concurring 
in Helms), he voted with the majority in Santa Fe, which is the only case involving de-
votional activities in public schools that the Court has reviewed during his tenure on 
the high court. His position in Helms may be the anomaly, as he seems more aligned 
with the "separationist" group. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2556 (O'Connor 
& Breyer, JJ., concurring); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 255 (1997) (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 863 (1995) 
(Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
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lead devotional activities in public schools. She voted with the 
majority both in Weisman and Santa Fe, suggesting that she 
may continue to apply a more stringent standard in assessing 
religious observances in public schools than in evaluating state 
aid to parochial schools. 108 Nonetheless, she made the often-
quoted statement that "there is a crucial difference between 
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establish-
ment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, 
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect" and 
has voiced strong support for protecting private religious ex-
pression in public education. 109 So, it is not beyond the realm of 
possibility that in a future decision she might vote to expand 
the types of student speech classified as "private." 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Even if the current Justices maintain the tenuous alliances 
evident in Santa Fe and Helms, reflecting somewhat divergent 
strands of Establishment Clause analysis depending on the is-
sue and school setting, new appointments to the Supreme 
Court are eminent. Several Justices have had health problems, 
and three are seventy or older. Assuming that eighty-year-old 
Justice Stevens, who is among the more separationist-oriented 
current Justices, is replaced by a Justice who supports gov-
ernmental accommodation toward religion, the constitutional-
ity of voucher programs and other government assistance to 
sectarian schools will be assured, and additional religious in-
fluences in public schools will likely be upheld. Moreover, a 
shift in the Court's composition could have a formidable impact 
on Establishment Clause doctrine in general, perhaps signaling 
a directional shift even more significant than the adoption of 
108. See 530 U.S. 290 2266 (2000); 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Justice O'Connor also con-
curred in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (Powell & O'Connor, JJ., con-
curring) (striking down a Louisiana law, calling for equal emphasis on creation science 
whenever evolution is taught in public schools, as advancing religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause). 
109. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995) 
(O'Connor, J., conncurring) (arguing that, "neutrality, in both form and effect, is one 
hallmark of the Establishment Clause," in that religion is neither endorsed nor disad-
vantaged); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 
(1990). Justice O'Connor also was in the majority in Lamb's Chapel and concurred in 
Rosenberger. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384 (1993). 
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the Lemon test in the early 1970s.110 Activity in this volatile 
area of constitutional law during the next decade may affect 
the contours of our religious liberties for generations to come. 
110. See supra notes 20, 38. 
